The Commentary Commentary of the Committee for Justice on the Egyptian Government’s Responses to the Recommendations of the Fourth Cycle of the Universal Periodic Review

Within the framework of the fourth cycle of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR), the Egyptian government participated in this UN mechanism, which was originally designed as a tool for monitoring, assessment, and encouragement to improve human rights conditions through voluntary and constructive international dialogue. However, a thorough examination of Egypt’s conduct throughout this cycle and its responses to the recommendations reveals a clear pattern: the government has approached the mechanism as a public relations exercise and a platform for political propaganda, rather than a binding or motivating process for genuine reform. The state has worked to strip the UPR of its substance by broadly accepting vague and general recommendations while rejecting—or merely “noting”—the substantive recommendations that are fundamental to any real progress in the human rights situation. It is worth noting that the UPR has become the last standing and effective international mechanism available to the international community in addressing Egypt’s human rights record. Over the past years, various international actors have made concerted efforts to encourage voluntary and meaningful improvements in Egypt’s human rights conditions through different tools. These included initiatives by the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), such as proposals to provide technical and institutional support for a broad reform program targeting rights-related institutions. Similarly, UN Special Procedures have played a role by addressing individual cases and specific violations, engaging the Egyptian authorities in official communications and offering training and technical assistance to improve state capacity in the fields of justice and human rights. Despite these multiple efforts, the Egyptian state has continued to act evasively and dismissively, especially when it comes to recommendations that address the core of the country’s rights crisis—such as ending security force abuses, guaranteeing fair trial standards, lifting restrictions on civil society, and safeguarding public freedoms. The lack of tangible progress—sometimes even deterioration—in key human rights indicators casts serious doubt on the government’s credibility and commitment to its international obligations. It reflects a strategy of deflecting external pressure without any real intent to implement reform. A closer analysis of Egypt’s position on the recommendations received during this UPR cycle reveals the government’s selective and evasive approach. While Egypt formally accepted 265 recommendations and partially accepted 16, it chose to merely “note” 62 recommendations—effectively a form of indirect rejection. These 62 recommendations largely concern core issues that would put the state’s willingness to implement political and human rights reforms to the test. They include calls for ratification of key international instruments such as the Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture (OPCAT) and the International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance, as well as demands to halt executions, guarantee fair trials, release political detainees (including Alaa Abdel Fattah), investigate extrajudicial killings (such as the Giulio Regeni case), and recognize the rights of LGBTQ+ persons. This selective approach, combined with the use of vague diplomatic language that conceals an underlying rejection of reform, demonstrates that the Egyptian government has failed to show even the minimum political or legal responsiveness expected of a member state of the Human Rights Council. In light of this, the international community is now more than ever called upon to link Egypt’s UPR commitments to stronger follow-up mechanisms and independent periodic oversight. Symbolic acceptance of recommendations should no longer be interpreted as genuine cooperation or goodwill, especially in the context of persistent, systematic human rights violations affecting large segments of the population. Egypt’s efforts to hollow out the UPR process have become apparent through the use of vague and formalistic responses that avoid any clear commitment to substantive reform. Although the government has accepted a large proportion of recommendations, most of these relate to general or uncontroversial issues, or to actions already undertaken with little real impact on the human rights landscape. Meanwhile, the government has systematically rejected or deflected recommendations concerning fundamental civil and political rights—such as the abolition of the death penalty, combatting torture, ensuring judicial independence, ceasing security harassment of human rights defenders, and upholding freedoms of association, peaceful assembly, and expression. Rather than rejecting these recommendations outright, the government has resorted to using the phrase “noted” as a diplomatic loophole to avoid binding commitments while masking its refusal to take real action. Notably, most of the recommendations treated in this way are those that represent cornerstones of any credible human rights reform agenda, thus revealing a clear lack of political will and an implicit refusal to acknowledge the gravity of Egypt’s human rights crisis. This approach confirms that the Egyptian authorities are exploiting the UPR as a stage for political propaganda rather than viewing it as an opportunity for self-assessment, identification of gaps, and engagement in a comprehensive reform process. Such a stance undermines the very objectives of the UPR, erodes international confidence in Egypt’s voluntary commitments, and entrenches a reality of impunity and systemic violations of fundamental rights. Therefore, the upcoming follow-up phase must be marked by rigorous monitoring and objective analysis of Egypt’s actual responsiveness to its international obligations, rather than reliance on the state’s rhetorical assurances. In conclusion, as Egypt continues its strategy of evasion and neglect of the UPR’s core recommendations, it has become evident that voluntary mechanisms alone are insufficient to address the country’s deteriorating human rights situation. Experience has shown that diplomatic discourse, training sessions, and technical support—despite their importance—have not produced any measurable improvement. On the contrary, violations have become more widespread, and indicators of justice and freedom have continued to decline. In this context, the international community now faces an urgent necessity: to push for the establishment of an independent international monitoring and investigative mechanism on Egypt. Such a mechanism should be mandated to gather and document gross human rights violations, submit periodic reports to international bodies, and track the extent of the Egyptian authorities’ compliance with their obligations. This is no longer a matter of political luxury—it is a pressing requirement dictated by the seriousness of the situation and the failure of all previous avenues to produce meaningful reform.